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PHYSICIAN FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
AND CESAREAN SECTION DELIVERY
ABSTRACT
The "induced demand" model states that in the fact of negative income shocks physicians
may exploit theft agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care in order to
maintain their incomes. We test this model by exploiting an exogenous change in the financial
environment facing obstetrician/gynecologists during the 1910s: declining fertility in the U.S.
We argue that the 13.5% fall in fertility over the 1970-1982 period increased the income pressure
on ob/gyns, and led them to substitute from normal childbirth towards a more highly reimbursed
alternative, cesarean delivery. Using a nationally representative micro-data set for this period,
we show that there is a strong correlation between within state declines in fertility and within
state increases in cesarean utilization. This correlation is robust to consideration of a variety of
alternative hypotheses, and appears to be symmetric with respect to periods of fertility decline
and fertility increase.
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and NBERA standardmodel ofphysician behavior in the health economics literature is that of "induced
demand'. This model states that in the face of negative income shocks physicians may exploit their
agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care in order to maintain their incomes.
Such a model has traditionally been tested by assessing the effects on the utilization of medical
procedures of two alternative changes in the environment facing physicians. The first is reductions
in the fees paid to physicians, generally by government payers. The second is variations., in the
physician/population density across areas; increased density lowers the income of the existing stock
of physicians, and will lead to increased utilization of medical procedures in an inducement-type
model.
Each of these approaches faces important problems, however. Fee changes cannot identify
supply responses because there may be a contemporaneous demand response to changing prices; that
is, if quantity rises when fees fall, this could reflect either induced or true increases in demand.
Using fee changes to identify inducement also raises the problem that substitution and income effects
go in opposite directions; even if there is no measured utilization response, there may be inducement,
but substitution and income effects may simply be cancelling. Studies that use physician density
differences to proxy for income shocks also face a fundamental identification problem. If there is
some unobserved area characteristic which is correlated with taste for medical interventions, an area
will feature both higher procedure utilization and more physicians, regardless of the extent of demand
inducement An obvious candidate for such sit omitted variable is the average coinsurance rate in
the area.
In this paper, we propose a new means of identifying the effect of induced demand on
procedure utilization. We exploit a plausibly exogenous change in the financial environment facing2
obstethcianlgyttcologistsduring the 1970s: declining fertility in the U.S. Fertility (births/100
population)fell by 13.5% duringthe 1970-1982period. We argue that declining fertility increased
the income pressure on ob/gyns, and led them to substitute from normal childbirth towards a more
highly reimbursed alternative: cesarean delivery. Used in only 5.5% of births in 1970, cesarean
deliveryrose by over 240% over thesubsequent 12 years, and it is now the second most frequently
performed major surgical procedure in the U.S.,witha rate of23.5 cesareandeliveries per 100
births.' This time series correlation between the fertility declinc and the cesarean utilization increase
raises the possibility that inducement played an important role in the substitution of cesarean delivery
for normal thildbirth.
The primary purpose ofthispaperisto testfora causal role of financial incentives in the use
ofcesareandelivery over the 1970-1982 period. We do so by exploitingthedramatic change in
fertility patterns across the U.S.statesduring this era.Conditional onthe characteristicsof the
mother and of the birth, statewide fertility changes should provide exogenous measures of the
financial pressure on ob/gyns in that state. Thus, we ask: in states where fertility was falling the
most, did cesarean delivery rise the most?
Our teat is carried out using a rich dataset of individual birth records from the 1970-1982
period. The National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) is a nationally representative survey of
hospitals which collects information, for a sample of discharges, on the nature of the hospital stay,
procedures performed during that stay, and the demographic characteristics of the patient. There is
data on approximately 20,000 deliveries annually from a wide cross-section of hospitals. We match
this data on individual births to information on changes in fertility levels by state and year, and
examine the effect of within state changes in fertility on the use of cesarean delivery. We use both
1Unpublished tabulations, National Center for Health Statistics.3
individual lent and state level data to control for a numberofother characteristics of mothers and
births, such as age, birth order, and infant health, which may be spuriously correlated with both the
fertility rate and the use of cesarean delivery.
To summarize, we find a strong correlation between within-state fertility declirts and within-
state increases in cesarean section delivery rates: a 10% deciS in the fertility rate is associated with
a 0.97 percentage point increase in the cesarean delivery rate. This finding is robust to a wide
variety of specification checks. It implies that financial incentives do play an important role in the
substitution of cesarean delivery for normal childbirth. This role was a small one relative to the
rapid growth in cesarean delivery, however; increased ob/gyn income pressure can only explain
between 16% and 32% of the substitution of cesarean delivery for normal childbirth during this era.
We begin,in Part1,bydiscussing the causes and consequences of the diffusion of cesarean
childbirth in the l970s. In PanII, wesummarize the literature on the induced demand hypothesis,
and present a brief model which notes the implications of this hypothesis for the use of cesarean
delivery when the fertility rate falls. Part IIIdescribesthe data sources and the empirical framework
used. Paxt IV presents the basic results and specification checks. Part Vassesseswhether cesarean
delivery responded asymmetrically to fertility rises and falls. Part VI concludes.
Part I: Background on Cesarean Delivery
Cesarean Delivery in the United Suites
The upper IS in Figure 1 charts the growt in the cesarean section rate (c-sections per 100
births) nationally over the 1970 to 1991 period. The rate doubled from 1970 to 1975, and doubled
again by 1984. Utilization of the procedure flattened out in the mid-1980s, and fell somewhat atthe
end of the decad& This rapid growth in c-section utilization was not restricted to any particular4
region, type of hospital, race, or age group (Placek and Taffel, 1980), The lowerlineshows the
growth in the primary cesareansection rate; until recently, women whohad received previous c-
sectionswere almost universally c-sectionedon all future birth!.2 The trend is similar, although a
growingfraction ofcesarean births over time isduetorepeat cesareans.
Thereisno consensus view a tothecause of this rapidincreasein cesarean utilization.
Perhaps the most frequentlycitedexplanation is the introduction of technologies for diagnosing fetal
distress, such a electronic fetal monitoring. The percentage of deliveries with no reported
complication fell from 70% in 1970 to 39% in 1984 (Shionoet aL,1987). and Williams and Hawes
(1979) document a suong correlation between the percent of deliveries by cesarean-section and the
proportion oflaborelectronically monitoredacrossCalifornia hospitals in 1977. However, cesarean
section rates grew within diagnosis as well. In 1970,11.6%of breech presentations were delivered
by c-section; by 1984, 80% were delivered in this fashion (Shiono et al., 1987). The NIH (1981)
shows that almost one-half of the growth in primary cesarean rates was within diagnosis growth,
Another important cause of c-section adoption was thought to be the legal environment.
Marieskind (1979) reports that the most frequent reason given by physicians for performing a
cesarean section was the threat of a malpractice suit. She cites a National Association of Insurance
Commissioners study which reports that, in 1975-76, ob/gyns faced 10 times the probability of suit
of otherphysicians.Recent econometric work which examines the regional correlation between
malpractice "threat, a measured by malpractice premiums or previous malpractice claims paid, and
31n 1970,98.3% of women with previous caesaream receivedc-sections; by1984, the rate had
fallen slightly to 96.1% (Shiono et al., 1987).S
cesarean utilization has produced mixedresults,however.3
Finwwiai Incentives for Cesarean Delivery
The hypothesistobe tested in the empirical work is that decliningfertility ledto a
substitutiontowards cesareandelivery, in order to alleviate the income pressure on obfgyns. A
necessary preconditionfor thishypothesis is that cesareans be reimbursed more highly than normal
childbirth, which has traditionally been true. The Health Insurance Association of America (1989)
reports that physician charges for cesarean delivery in 1989 were $2,053. compared to $1,492 for
vaginal delivery. While no such systematic data are available for the 1970s, Marieskind (1979)
reports fee differences for a sample of cities for the late 1970's: the average differential was
approximately 40%, which is similar to the 1989 differential.
These higher reimbursement levels are not necessarily justified by increased physician inputs.
In terms of the time invesunent only. cesarean delivery is much more efficient for the ob/gyn; unlike
normal childbirth, cesarean deliveries can be scheduled in advance, and they often take less time than
a normal childbirth with extended labor. Of course, cesarean delivery is a more difficult procedure.
However, the 1993 revision of the resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS). which measures
physician workloads by the product of intensity and time, concluded that the workload for vaginal
delivery is actually higher than that of cesarean delivery (Keeler and Brodie, 1993).'
'See Keeler and Brodie (1993) for a review, and Localio et al. (1993) and Tussing and
Wojotocz (1992) for results. Furthermore, none of these studies has been able to surmountthe
problem that there may be omiued regional variables correlated with both of the malpracticethreat
measures and cesarean utilization.
'This discussion does not account for any disutility from the extra training necessary for cesarean
delivery; however, Marieskind (1979, p. 121) notes that obstetricians were not eventrained in
vaginal breech delivery by the late 1970s, so that these training costs have presumably alreadybeen
paidbypracticing ob/gyns.6
Furthermore, the structureofprivate insurancecoverage during the1970s mayhave
-
contributed to the financial rewards to cesarean delivery. A commonly accepted feature of health
insurance benefits before the rnid-1970s was limited coverage for childbirth. Maternity coverage was
sometimes excluded from basic health benefits; if included, it was often subject to flat rate cash
amount limits regardless of the cost of delivery. Many policies, however, limited coverage of
normal childbirth only, and hilly covered the costs of cesarean delivery. In this case, there would
be an incentive for the physician to substitute cesarean childbirth for normal delivery.This
differential coverage was outlawed by several state mandates in the 1975-1978 period and then by
Federal statute inOctober,1978 (Gruber, 1992).'
There have been two types of previous studies of the role of financial incentives in the use
of cesarean delivery. The first focuses on differences in cesarean utilization by insurance coverage
type. The relative rewards for cesarean delivery for the privately insured are much higher than for
the publicly insured or uninsured.Using data in American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (1989), we calculate that the average reimbursement differential for cesarean delivery
in 1989 under Medicaid was only $230, which is 40% as large as the average differential in
physician charges discussed above. For uninsured patients, the financial rewards may be lower still,
51n theory, these state and federal laws changed the financial incentives of physicians in a testable
way, by levelling the playing field between normal childbirth and cesarean delivery. This test runs
into two problems in practice, however. First, while most private insurance did limit coverage of
normal childbirth, many policies limited coverage of cesarean delivery as well. (3ruber (1992) finds
that 30% of private insurance plans in 1977 paid less than the physician's usual charges for childbirth
than for other procedures. Thus, these laws, which typically introduced first dollar coverage of a
physician's usual charge for both normal and cesarean childbirth, simultaneously increased the
incentives for both types of delivery. In addition, as noted below, we cannot identi' privately
insured patients in our data before 1977, which does not leave much variation in the legal
environment before the federal statute of October, 1978. Perhaps due to these problems, we were
unable to find significant effects of these law changes on cesarean utilization. The inclusion of these
variables, however, did not affect the coefficient on fertility in the regressions reported below.7
asthere is a reasonable probability that the billwillnot be paid at all. Epstein ci at.(1989)find for
a sample of Massachusetts hospitals that 80% of total charges to self-pay patients are not paid.
While similar figures for physicians charges are not available, thissuggeststhat physicians may be
unable to recoup from uninsured patients the differential charge for doing a cesarean delivery.
Stafford (1990) examined cesarean rates by payment source in a sample of California
hospitals,aix!found resultswhichlütd up quite wellwiththese financial incentives: cesarean rates
were highest for those with private insurance, followed by the publiclyinsured, andthen the
uninsured. It is difficult, however, to draw causal inferences from this fact because there may be
omitted characteristics by payer class which are correlated with the cesarean decision (ie. birth
severity).
The second test focuses on the supposition, made for example by Marieskind (1979). that a
declining fertility rate and increases in ob/gyn density may have led to increased use of cesarean
delivery in the 1970s; this point is developed theoretically below. Tussing and Wojotowycz (1992),
examining New York data, find no evidence that cesarean delivery rates are higher where there is
a higher obgyn density. Once again, however, such a study suffers from the fact that there may
be omitted regional differences which are correlated with both higher obfgyn density and cesarean
utilization.
Consequences of C-Section D{ffisIon
One potential cause of the diffusion of cesarean sections was the belief that they were
instrumental in improving birth outcomes. There is a strong time series correlation between the
rapid improvement in birth outcome in the U.S. and the diffusion of cesarean sections. From 1968
to 1983, the infant mortality rate in the U.S. was halved; this is the exact time period that saw rapid8
diffusion of cesarean sections. However, Marieskind (1979) is critical of this interpretation of the
time series data, noting that there were many other technological advances in the treatment of
childbirth, such as the development of neonatal intensive care units.
Micro-data evidence on the effectivenessofcesarean delivery is mixed. Williamsand Hans
(1979) studied a sample oIhospitals in California in 1977, and found a correlation between increased
use of technology in childbirth, including fetal monitoring and cesarean delivery, and the
demographically-adjusted perinatal mortality rate. On the other hand, in a sample of mature (>2500
grams)breech birthsin New York City, the NIH (1981) found no change in survival probabilities
over time, despite a sizeable rise in the cesarean delivery rate. And Finkler and Wirtschafter(1993)
find no relationshipbetweencesarean section use and risk-adjusted birth outcomes acrosstheir
sampleof eightCalifornia hospitals.
While we are unaware of any randomized clinical trials to evaluate the effectiveness of
cesarean sections, there have been several trials wtiich randomly assigned the availability of
electronic fetal monitoring. Three of the four studies found that monitoring was associated with
higher c-section rates, but no improvements in perinatal outcomes (NIH, 1981).
Cesarean delivery is also more costly than vaginal childbirth, along two dimensions. The
first is physiological costs. Maternal mortaiity is very low overall (approximately 1 death per 10,000
births),butit is two to four times as high for cesarean as for vaginal deliveries (NIH, 1981).'
Therearea nwnber oflesssevere but morecommonrisks as well,such aspost-operative infection
andhemorrhage. Therearealso potential physiological costs to the infant, suchasrespiraotY
distress syndrome in infants who are delivered prematurelybyc-section (Marieskind, 1979)-
'More recent data on mazental mortality may show a smaller differential between vaginal and
cesarean deliveries.9
The second is financialcosts. In1989, the total (doctor and hospital) costs of a cesarean
delivery were 66% higher than the costsofa normal delivery (Health Insurance Association of
America,1989).In that year, there were 938,000 cesarean sectiondeliveries inthe U.S.(Graves
aridKozack, 1992). If these deliveries had beenas costlyas the average normal childbirth, thenthis
accounts for a differential of $2.7 billion dollars in medical spending. While this is clearly an upper
bound, since cesarean deliveries are likely to be more severe, it does highlightthe largedifferential
expenditure on cesarean delivery in the U.S.
Part 11:Induced Demand - Theoryand Evidence
An inducementModel
Theinduceddemand hypothesis has beenexplored bya number ofstudies over the past
twenty years. The building block of this theoryisthenotion that,asthe agent oftheuninformed
patient, physicians areable to determine the levelof demand for theirproduct.' Physicians are
generally posited to haveutility functions whichdependpositively on their income,leisure,andon
delivering the 'appropriate' amount of care.Thelast factor canenter eitherthroughthephysician's
'internal conscience' (McGuire and Pauly, 1991), or as a result of a reputation process by which
physicianswho excessively induce demandarepunished through future reductions in true patient
demand (Dranove, 1988).' Inducement can be defined as the deviation of treatment levels from that
whichequates the marginal benefits and costs to patients (Fuchs,1978).
A natural of inducement models is that a fall inthe birth ratewillleadtoadoption
'Dranove(1988) correctly notes that induced demand models can be equally well applied to other
agency relationships between buyers and (expert) sellers.
'For earlier models of this type of provider behavior, see Evans (1974) and Newhousc (1970).10
ofmore highlyreimbursed procedures such as cesareandelivery. This is readily illustrated in a
sample inducement model, along the lines of McGuire and Pauly (1991)! We take the number of
birthsasgiven to the ob/gyn.1° We also assume that the only margin forinducementis to increase
intensity by shifting the nature of the delivery from a normal childbirth to a cesarean delivery. This
is not strictly true, since ob/gyns appear to earn only about one-half of their income from obstetrics
onaverage."Introducing other dimensions of inducement into the model would not change the
direction of our prediction, however; whether inducement in fact takes place through the type of
delivery is ultimately an empirical question.
We posit that the ob/gyn has a utility function of the form:
(1) U=U(Y,1)
whereY is full income, earnings minus the value of foregone leisure, and I is the extent of
"inducement", which cwses the physician disutility through either the "internal conscience' or
"demand reduction" channels (U > 0, U, < 0; Un, U0 < 0). The number of births is B, and the
level of inducement per birth is i, so that I = Bi; the total disutility from inducement depends on the
total amount of inducement across all patients. The fraction of cesarean deliveries is a(i), a' > 0,
a" = 0. Thus, the budget constraint is:
'We are grateful to Tom McGuire for suggesting this formulation of the McGuire/Pauly model
for our case.
'°This may be particularly inappropriate in the 1970s, since most insurance plans did not cover
the cost of normal childbirth, so that demand may have been somewhat price elastic. However, even
if the number of births for a given ob/gyn is price elastic, changes in the stock of births in the state
still provide an exogenous shock to the income of the average ob/gyn in that state.
"ACOG(1992) reports that56%ofob/gyns earn at least 40% of their incomes, and 76% earn
at least 25%oftheir incomes, fromobstetrics.Furthermore,datain ACOG (1992) indicates that
55.8% of ob/gynvisitsare for pre-nalal or post-natal care, and the American Medical Association
(AMA, 1992)reportsthat one-half of all surgical procedures performed by ob/gyns are childbirth.11
(2)Y=YN+YC-
C= Ba(i)
N = B(1 -a(i))
where N is the number of normal births, and C is the number of cesareans. Y, and I'0 are the full
incomes from performing normal and cesarean deliveries, respectively. We assume that Y,.>Y•.
Thatis, we assume that the reimbursement premium for ceurean deliveries is sufficiently high to
compensate the physician for any toss in leisure from perfos-nsing a cesarean. This seems reasonable
given the data presented above that cesarean fees are much higher,thatcesarean delivery takes less
time, and that the increased difficulty of cesarean delivery does not, in the judgement of the experts
who developed the RBRVS, compensate for the time reduction.
We follow McGuire and Pauly in assuming separable utility. The first order condition
becomes:
(3)Uycr'[Y-YJ +U10
Thatis, the physician trades off the net disutility from inducement against the net utility from
increasingincomethrough shifting to cesarean delivery. Suppose now that the number of births, B,
is exogenously reduced. Fully differentiating (3), we obtain:
(4)i=iUfl7B)a'Ct -Vi <0
ÔB U
Thatis, as births fail, inducement per birth rises, so that the rate of cesarean delivery rises. We
discuss the magnitude of this incentive in more detail in Part III.
PhysicianPype. MobiWy, and Entry
Twoimponant further assumptions underlie this model. First, we have assumed thatall
births are delivered by ob/gyns. If in fact a non-tivial share of births are delivered by practitioners12
other than ob/gyns. then ob/gyns may be insulated from changes in the birth rate. That is, deliveries
by non-ob/gyns may hilly absorb fluctuations in the number of births, so that ob/gyns have no
change in inducement incentives. If only ob/gyna perform cesarean deliveries,thenthis scenario
could in fact lead to a spurious (from our perspective)negative correlationbetween fertility changes
and cesarean utilization.
The vast majority of births, however, are delivered by ob/gyns. During our sample period,
over 99% of all birth! were delivered by a physician in a hospital setting (Vim!Statistics). Of
physicians,the AMA (1993) reportsthat ob/gyns perform 13.8 deliveries per month, while general
and family practitioners (the second largest category) perform only 0.7. The number of general and
family practitioners is approximately twice that of the number of ob/gyns, so that ob/gyns deliver
over 90% of all babies by this calculation. Similarly, using data on the fraction of dollars derived
from delivery services for a large Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan in a major U.S. city, we tabulate that
87% of delivery dollars were attributable to ob/gyns.
Second, we have assumed that ob/gyns are immobile. If ob/gyns are mobile, then their
location may respond to fertility changes in a way which partially offsets the inducement incentives
documented above. In fact, it does appear that ob/gynsrespondto changes in fertility rates in
making their locational decisions; a regression over the 1970-1982 period of the log of the number
of ob/gyns on the log of the fertility rate, including a full set of state and year dummies, yields a
significant and positive coefficient of roughly 0.2. To the extent that ob/gyns are offsetting fertility
declinesby theirlocational choices, it will lead to a smaller effect of fertility changes on the use of
cesarean delivery in the empirical work below. Whether these locational choices are sufficient to13
fully undothe need for inducement in response to failingfertilityis an empirical question)2
Thereis also a simple fact which seems to contradict the contentions of this model: entry into
obstetricsand gynecology continued unabated during the era offertility decline, withob/gyns per
capitaincreasingby38% from 1970 to 1982. If fertilitydecreases were increasing the financial
pressure on ob/gyns, whyshouldthey havecontinued to enterthis field at sucha rapid rate? There
area number of other factors, however, which may have affected the attractiveness of medical
professionsduringthis era, such as the general decline in returns to higher education of the 1970s
(Freeman, 1976).A more relevant question is whether entry into this field relative to other medical
sub-specialtiesresponded to fertility changes. In fact, there is a strong positivecorrelation (p0.75)
between annual fertility rates and the ratio of ob/gyris to other physicians in theU.S. overthe 1970-
1982 period. This suggests that, conditional on choosing to enter the medical profession, individuals
were considering the relative rewards of this field in making their specialty decision.
InducedDemand -PastEvidence
Asnoted above, induceddemand effects have been posed and testedintwo different contexts.
Thefirst is reductions in the fees paid to physicians, generally by government payers. In this case,
inducement operates through both the substitution and income effects, so that the net effect on the
'21t is possible that ob/gyn mobility could lead to a correlation between fertility and the cesarean
rate that was independent of induced demand. Suppose that there were two types of obfgyns, high
quality and low quality, and that high quality ob/gyns performed more cesareans. If the fertility fall
leadsto a fall in demand for low quality ob/gyns, they may leave the state, raising the measured
cesarean delivery rate through a compositional effect. Given the estimated mobility response,
however, this effect will in general not be large enough to explain our findings below. For example,
ifinitially112 of ob-gyns are Low quality and do 10% cesarean deliveries and 112 are highquality
and do 20%cesareandeliveries, and there isa 10% fertility decline which leads to a 2% net outflow
of ob/gyns, and all of the outflow conies fromthelow quality sector, the cesarean delivery rate
would rise from 15% to 15.1%. This.is much smallerthantheeffectestilnatedbelOW, which is on
theorder of a 1 percentage point rise in the c-section rate for a 10% fertility fall.14
quantity of services isunclear.However, most previous studies have tested for inducement by
assessing whether quantity increased when fees were reduced (that is, under the assumption that
income effects dominate substitution effects); in the limit, with a "target income", quantity increases
fully undo theprice reductions.
Thereis some evidence that fee reductions lead to increases in quantities, although the
magnitude of inducement is very uncertain. The strongest evidence for induced quantity increases
is Rice's (1984) study of a Medicare fee reduction in Colorado; he found that a 10% decline in
physician reimbursements led to a 6.1% increase in intensity of medical services and a 2.7% increase
in intensity of surgical services. However, a similar study by Hurley, Rice, and Labelle (1990) for
Ontario found mixed responses to fee changes across procedures. Evidence from the experiences
of the U.S. and Canada with fee controls offers a similarly mixed picture of the role of induced
demand; see Wedig, Mitchell, and Cromwell (1989), Feldman and Sloan (1988, 1989), and Rice and
Labelle (1989) for a discussion.
The second contextfortesting induced demand is the response of procedure use to variations
in thephysician/populationdensity across areas. Evidence ontheuse of surgeryin responseto an
increased supplyof surgeons is presented inFuchs (1978)andCromwell and Mitchell(1986). Both
authors looked at a cross section of locations over several years, and found strong evidence for
demand inducement; the latter findings are about one-third as large as the former. Birch (1989) and
Grytten ci aL(1991)also find very strong positive relationships between dentists/capita and
utilization of dental services)3
As discussed in the introduction, both of these methodologies face important identification
'3For reviews of the induced demand literature, see Feldman and Sloan (1988) or Dranove and
Wehner (1994).15
problems. The problem of omittedvariablescorrelated with physician density is discussed in Auster
and Oaxaca (1981), Phelps (198), and Feldman and Sloan (1988). Both Fuchs and Cromwell and
Mitchell attempt to surmount thisproblemby finding instuments correlated with physician density,
such as population disthbution acrou ncoandnon-rico areas, average wages, and other socio-
economic characteristics of the area. It is unclear, however, whether these instnsments are also
uncorrelated with taste for surgery; wealthier or more urban areas may feature differentaverage
coinsurance rates.14
In thispaper,we propose an alternative means of identifying an inducement effect for
ob/gyns: using changes in the fertility rate. The model above shows that changes in fertility will
have inducement-type incentives. And, conditional on the characteristics of the mother and the birth,
statewide changes in fertility should be an exogezus shock to the income of ob/gyris. In the
empirical work below, we will consider this exogertity assumption in more detail, by controlling
for a number of potential omitted correlates of fertility rate changes and cesarean delivery rates.
In some specifications below, we will also follow the previous literature in using changes in
ob/gyn density to proxy for income pressure. We potentially improve on previous estimates of the
effect of physician density on procedure utilization by including location (state) fixed effects in the
regression, thus controlling for any omitted variables which are constant over time. Nevertheless,
writ of the identification problems noted by the critics of this approach are difficult to surmount
simply by using within-area changes. Thus, we will primarily rely on fertility changes to proxy
income pressure on ob/gyns in the estimation.
"This criticism is levelled most damningly by Dranove and Wehner (1994), who find that, using
a similar instrumental variables methodology to Mitchell and Cromwell (1986), increasing the
number of ob/gyns in an area increases the number of births!16
Part III:Data andEmpirical Framework
Data
zr primary data source is the National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) conducted by
the National Center of Health Statistics (NCHS) annually since 1965.This is a nationally
representative survey of over 400 hospitals, wtith contains information on approximately 200,000
discharges in each year.The survey collects information on some limited demographic
characteristics of the patient, features of the hospital, primary and secondary diagnoses, and primary
and secondary procedures. We use information on patients with a primary diagnosis of childbirth
in the years 1970-1982; the final sample consists of over 250,000 births. The public use (lie of the
NHDSonly identifiesthe region of the hospital. These files were augmented with state identifiers,
and all analysis was carried out at the NCHS.'5
The means for the dasaset are presented in Table 1, forboththe fill dataset, and for those
births which did and did not get delivered by c-section." Approximately 11.9% of births are by
cesarean section over this tint period. While the mority of births are to younger women, the
majority of c'sections are performed on older women. There are relatively few deliveries in (or-
profit hospitals in this time period. The most striking differences between the cesarean and non-
cesarean columns are in the figures for hospital size and for severity codes; cesareans are much more
likely in large hospitals, and are strongly correlated with a complicated delivery. Since our
identifying variation will come fromstatelevel changes in fertility, it is comforting to note that we
'5fl-e NHDS does not collect data (or three low population states so these states were dropped
fromthe analysis.The NHDS also provides weights to cap'ure the probability that a given discharge
was sampled. All results were computed both weighted and unweighted, and were very similar in
every case. The results reported below are unweighted.
"The NHDSonlyidentifies expected source ofpaymentfrom 1977 onwards, so we do not use
that variable in our basic analysis. We do use it in one specification check below.17
havea reasonably large average sample sizeofdeliveries for each stale/year. Themeannumber of
deliveriesby state/year is837, aMthe value rangesfroma minimum of 17 toa maximum of2767.
In ordertoexaminethe effect of fertility onthe useof cesareandelivery, we exploitthe
substantial variation across states in fertility changesinthis era. Data on the number of births in
eachstate andyearisavailablefromthe NCHS' Vital Statistics of the United Staus)7 Figure 2
graphs the average fertility raze, births per 100 population,byyear for our sample period.There
is a striking decline in fertility from 1970-75, and a moderate rise from 1977-1982. Over the entire
period, fertility falls from 1.84 births/lO0 persons to 1.59 births/100 persons, a decline of 13.5%."
These national trends mask substantial heterogeneity in fertility changes within states over
dire. Figures 3A and 38 illustrate two examples of this heterogeneity. In both North Carolina and
Kansas. there were steep fertility declines in the early years of the sample period. However, while
fertility declined until 1976 and was flat thereafter in North Carolina, fertility dropped much more
rapidly in Kansas,androse thereafter,sothat by 1982 fertility levels were actually higher than in
1970. Approximately 10% of the total variation in fertility rates from 1970-1982 is within state
variation in fertility over time. Ranking states by their fertility rates in 1970 and again in 1982,
there is only a 0.58 correlation in the ranking acrossthetwo years, and 28 stales changed their
'ideally, the fertility rate would be calculated as the ratio of births to the female population of
child-bearing age. However, population estimates by stale/sex/age group are not available between
1970 and 1980, so we use total population in our basic estimates. Attempting to correct our
regressor for txtnds in the demographic composition of each state's populationhas little effect on the
results.
"Fertility fell dramatically as well from 1960-1965, and then was roughly constant until 1970.
Data are not available for this earlier period. Our assumption is that cesarean utilization had adjusted
to the earlier transition by 1970, so that we can assess the net new contribution of the changefrom
1970 onwards. But the fact that the earlier fertility decline did not lead to widespread adoptionof
cesarean delivery highlights the crucial interactions between the incentives exploredhere and other
factors determining technological adoption, such as the evolution of complementary technologieslike
fetalmonitoring.18
ranking bymore than 10 positions during this period.
Whatdrove these differential fertility changes across the states?Thereare anumberof
hypothesesfor the nationwide changes in fertility during thisperiod,although we are awareof rio
state-specific analyses for these years: postponement ofmarriageand rising divorce rates; increasing
use of reliable contraceptives; liberalized laws on abortion;" concern about environmental issues and
overpopulation; increased entry into and opportunities in the labor force for women; and cyclical
coriditions.Gibson (1976) findsthat over 80% of the decline in fertility from 1970-75 was due to
declinesin maritalfertility.BothGibsonand Bloom andTrussell(1984) findthat this decline was
composed of both permanent fertilityeffects andchanges inthe timingofbirths; sontofthe
bouncebackin fertility in the later part of the decade may have been a result of these timing
effects.
Thispaperwillnot explorethe determinantsofthesecross-stale fertilitychanges: rather, we
ill take themasexogenouslocalshocks to the income of ob/gyns which can be used to test the
induceddemand model. A number of alternative hypotheses can be suggested for a fertility/cesarean
correlation, and weaddressthese at length in Part IV. While itisdifficult to convincingly refiute
all possible alternative hypotheses forthis correlation,we find it to be remarkably robust to any
alternative considered.
How large is the financial incentive arising from these differential fertility changes? We
"Westoff and Ryder (1977) document a large decline in unwanted births during the 1960s, and
conjecture that this continued into the 1970..Statistics Canada (1984),analyzing parallel
demograpisic trends in Canada, noted that in 1968, 16% of couples in Quebec did not want their last
child; by 1976, this ratio hal declined to 7%.
3°Bucz and Ward (1979) docwnent countercyclical fertility, which they explain as a function of
fertility responding to changing labor market opportunities of women. While there was a recession
during the tail end of this period of fertility decline, the economy was growing at its start.19
noted above that one-half of ob/gyn income is from obstetrics, and fertility felt by 13.5% during the
1970-1982 period. Assuming that, in the absence of a behavioral response, the decline in income
from obstetrics would parallel the decline in the birth rate, the implied fall in ob/gyn income of
6.75%, which is non-trivial, lithe change in ob/gyn density is taken to be exogenous, then the
pressure on ob/gyn income is even greater: ob/gyns per birth rose by 58% in this era. Moreover,
ob/gyn density increases could affect both income from obstetrics and gynecology, so that this
represents a negative income shock on the order of 30% or more.
As Table 1 shows, the means for ob/gyn density and fertility support our hypothesis of
induced demand:cesareansare more likely where there are more obstetricians and fewer births.2'
However, this hypothesis is most appropriately tested in a multivariateregressionframework, which
we describe next.
Empirical Framework
In order to assess the effect of financial incentives on the cesarean decision, we initially run
logit regressions of the fonn:
(5) CSECII =f(a+ $,X. + $2PREV11 + $,Z + $4LOBK1D + $ö + $; +
where CSEC1. is equal to one if individual i in hospital h in state jinyear treceived a c-section,
and zero otherwise
X is a set of individual demographic characteristics
PREy is an indicator for previous cesarean delivery
Zisa set of hospital characteristics
LOBKID is the log of the number of ob/gyris per birth
is a full set of state dummy variables
r1 is a full set of year dummy variables
In this regression, the cesarean decision is modelled as function of a number of characteristics
2tDataon ob/gyn density in each state and year is from the AMA's Physician Characteristics and
Distribution In the U.S.20
ofthemothersndthehospital,aswellastheob/gyndensity(ob/gyn3perbirth)inthestate.If
ob/gynlocational choice can be taken as exogenous, then theob/gyn density provides the appropriate
measureof thenegative income shock for ob/gyns; cesareans are snore likely tobe induced where
eitherthe supplyof ob/gyns arerising or the birth rats is falling. However, as documented above,
weareconcerned that thenumber of obfgyrts doesnotprovide anexogenousmeasure of financial
pressure, so that ourpreferred specification is:
(6) CSEC. = ((cx + + $2PREV+ft3Z, + $4LFERT,++ $6;+
where LFERT is the log of the state/year fertility rate (births/100 population). In this specification,
we identify the eulect of financial pressure solely from changes in fertility. We normalize births by
population becasise, since we are no longer explicitly including the number of ob/gyns in the state,
population growth provides an exogenous indicator of the trend growth in ob/gyns (and thus the
underlying growth in births needed to maintain ob/gyn income)!
We control for the age of the mother with a series of dummy variables, since the likelihood
of cesarean delivery rises sharply with age; we include dummies for 5 year age intervals from 20-45,
and for 45 and above (the omitted group being those under 20). We also include indicator variables
for whether the mother is white or black (other non-white being the excluded group), and an
indicator for married mothers.
We control for whether the mother is coded as having a previous cesarean, since cesarean
DOur conclusions are not sensitive to the use of this normalization. Appendix Table Al presents
the basic regression results using log births, log births along with log population, log fertility, and
the level of fertility. In each case, the coefficient on the regressor of interest is highly significant
in the expected direction, although the magnitudes of the effects vary somewhat across the columns.
Whenlog birth and log population are entered separately, theyhave almost identical and opposite
(statisticallysignificant) coefficients,supporting the contention that a normalization by population is
appropriate.21
delivery is almost certain in this case? In some specifications,wealso control for several
indicators of birthseverity,in order tp capture any spurious correlation between fertility rates and
severity.Themeasuresthatwe use are:breedi presentation, fetaldistress, maternal distress, and
other complications. Therearetwo problems, fromour perspective, in includingthese controls.
The first is that, since they are coded bytheob/gyn, they are also potentially endogenoustothe same
economic factors determiningthecesarean decision. Ifphysiciansare going to induce demand for
a cesarean, they mustindicatea diagnosis which justifiestheuse ofthis more intensivetechnique.
Numerousstudies have documented suchcodingcreep' within the context of Medicare's
ProspectivePayment System (ie. Carter, Newhouse, and Relies, 1990). Second, there was a major
changeinthe diagnosis codingsystemin the middle of our sample period (1978). The tint series
for some of the severity indicators show marked changes between 1978 and 1979, So long as these
changesareoccurring nationwide, however, they will be captured by our time controls.Neither of
theseproblems are likelytobe important for the previous cesarean indicator.
Table 1 indicated that cesareans are more likely in larger hospitals, so we control for hospital
bed size; we also control for whether the hospital is for-profit or government owned (non-profit
being the excluded group)Y We include a full set of year dummies in all regressions, since there
was a strong trend in cesarean delivery over this period. Finally, we include a full set of state
dummies, so that we can control for fixed differences across areas which might be correlated with
Thin our sample, 97% of women with previous cesarean childbirth had their births by cesarean
delivery. The previous indicator may also be capturing some effects of birth order, since previous
is zero by definition for the first birth, and first births are imwe likely to be delivered by cesarean
section (Marieskind, 1979).
24unfortunately data on teaching status of the hospital is not available, although there is likely
tobelittle within-state change in teaching status over this period that is not captured by changes in
hospital size or ownership.22
bothfertility and the cesarean decision.
Part IV:Results
Basic Results
Table2 presents the basic regression results. The first column reports the results from
running equation (5).Thereis a significant positive relationship between the log of ob/gyn density
and the probability of cesarean delivery: a 10 percent increase in the ob/gyn density raises the
probability of a cesarean by 0.6 percentage points.
The likelihood of cesarean delivery rises with age, as indicated by Table 1. The increase is
monownic until the highest age group, where there is sont reduction; however, this category
contains only a very small number of observations, and an overall increase with age cannot be
rejected. Cesareandeliveryis more likely for married mothers and white mothers. Previous
cesarean delivery, as expected, is an incredibly strong predictor of current cesarean delivery.
Cesarean delivery is much more likely in large hospitals, a relation which has been documented at
length in the literature. Cesareans are also somewhat more likely at for-profit hospitals, and much
less likely at government hospitals, than at non-profit hospitals. The state and year dummies (not
reported) are highly jointlysignificant.
In column (2).wedisaggregate the doctor/birth ratio intothelogof ob/gynsper 100
population and the log of the fertilityrate. Bothcoefficients ate supportive oftheinduced demand
view;thatis, cesarean rates were rising both where the number ofob/gynswas increasingandwhere
the birth rate was declining. Both coefficients are statistically significant. In column (3) we exclude
theob/gyn ratio altogether.Theeffectoffertility is sontwhat strengthened; afall inthe fertility rate
of 10%isassociated with an increase in the likelihood ofcesareandelivery of0.97percentage23
points. In column (4), we exclude the fertility rate, and examine the effect of changes in ob/gyns
per 100 population. Theeffectof ob/gyn density increases somewhat.
How Large are these effects? A 10% decline in the fertility rate approximately translates to
a5%drop in the income of ob/gyns, if they do not change their behavior. In 1989 cesarean delivery
was reimbursed $561 more highly than normal childbirth, and the typical physician performs 168
birthsperyear (AMA, 1993).A onepercentage point rise in cesarean utilization translates to 1.68
more cesarean deliveries per year, or an income increase of $943.In1989, the average ob/gyn
income was $194,300 (MedicalEconomics. September3,1990),so that this represents an income
rise of only 0.5%. This suggests that the shift to cesarean delivery only offset a very small part of
thenegativeincome shockfacing ob/gyns!
Analternative means of scaling the result is to calculate the implied contribution of the 1970-
1982 fertility decline to the growth in cesarean utilization over this period. Viewing ob/gyn density
as exogenous, our finding in column (1) implies that the increase in ob/gyn density over the 1970-
1980 period can explain 2.9 percentage points of the 9.1 percentage point increase in primary
cesarean delivery rates (32%). Alternatively, viewing only the fertility differences as exogenous,
we find that fall in fertility experienced by the U.S. from 1970-1982 can account for 1.45 percentage
points of primary cesarean increase, which is only 16% of the growth raze of cesarean delivery over
UnfortunaSely, data does not exist to permit a comparable calculation for the 1970s, but the
inference is undoubtably quitesimilar'inthatera, given that Marieskind (1979) reports similar
cesarean delivery fee premiums for the late 1970s (as noted above).
ln this calculation and the ones to follow, we compare the estimated effect of our inducement
indicators to the growth in primary cesarean deliveries, not total ceurean deliveries, This Is
because, by conditioning on preview cesarean delivery, we are modelling the effect ofinducement
on the primary cesarean decision. In fact, if these models are estimated only on the samplewithout
previous cesareandelivery, the resultsare almost identical, as would be expectedgiven the very
smalllikelihood of vaginal birth after cesarean.24
this period.
To summarize, our basic findings are very supportive of the hypothesis that ob/gyris
responded to falling fertility in this era by performing more cesarean section deliveries. The
estimated response is small, however, relative to the shock to ob/gyn income, and the finding implies
that the general fertility decrease during this era can explain only a small part of the overall growth
in cesarean utilization
Specjflcarion Qiecks
We findthe results in Table 2 to be striking evidence for inducement. It is important to note,
however, that there are a number of alternative interpretations of this finding than the one we have
given. We are unable to refute all of these alternatives. In this section, we consider several of the
most natural ones.
The first is that the average riskiness of births increases as the number of births decline. In
this case, the use of cesarean delivery may change, not due to physician financial incentives, but due
to the natural correlation between high-risk births and the use of c-sections." Micro-data studies
have shown that very low or high birthweight or gestation are correlated with the use of cesarean
delivery (Marieskind, 1979).
We have already controlled for some characteristics of the mother (ie. age) which might
indicate a high risk birth. In Table 3, we consider two further steps; in each case, we only report
"For example, suppose thai there are two types of mothers: those wtio are both careful with
contraception and take good care of their fetuses ("prudenC mothers), and those who do neither
(imprudent mothers). Fertilityamongimprudent mothers in this model will be roughly constant,
so that,asfertilitydrops,ahigher fraction ofbirths will be represented byimprudentmothers. This
willlead to a positive correlation between the fertility rate arid the quality of the fetus, and thereby
a spurious (from our perspective) negative correlation between the fertility rate and the cesarean
section rate.25
the coefficients of interest, as the other covariates see little change in their marginal effects. In the
firstcotumn, wecontrolfor three indicators of the underlyingriskiness ofbirths in state j in year
t:the fractionof live birthsthatdie Within 28 days (the neonatal mortality rate), the fraction of births
that are low birth weight at birth (ten than 2500 grams). and the fraction of births that are very high
birthweight at birth (more than 4500 grams). These data are reported by state and year in the
publication VitalSwitsdcs.If changes in fertility affect the use of cesarean delivery only through
changes in birth severity, then including these regressors should substantially reduce our coefficient
ofinterest.
Infact,the inclusion of thesestate levelseverity controls has tithe effect on our result.The
coefficienton fertility is virtually unchanged.Theresults indicatethatboth more low and high
birthweight births lead to more cesarean deliveries, which is consistent with our priors.
Interestingly, there is a negative correlation between neonatal mortality and the cesarean rate. This
could refute the hypothesisthatmore high risk births lead to more cesarean delivery. Alternatively,
it could provide evidence that cesarean delivery itself lowers the neonatal mortality rate, despite the
lack of convincing previous evidence described above. In the absence of a convincing instrument
for cesarean delivery, however, we are reluctant to assign such a causal inference.
An alternative approach to controlling for underlying riskiness is to include diagnosis
indicators for the severity of the individual birth. While these are potentially endogenous, it may
still be insiructive to examine the effects of their inclusion on our findings. In fact, as column (2)
of Table 3 shows, our finding is somewhat strengthened when these controls are added. This further
mitigates against an explanation for these results based on underlying riskiness. The severity
indicators themselves are all highly significant. Conditional upon individual severity, the effects of
state level severity measures are weakened; the only significant remaining correlation is with high26
birthweight births, and the coefficient on mortality is now positive.
In the remaining column of Table 3, we directly examine the relationship between two of
these severity indicators and the fertility rate. There is a significant risc in the rate at which both
fetal distress and maternal disaess are diagnosed as fertility deceases. This could be construed as
evidence that fertility affects the underlying riskiness of the birth. Alternatively, it could be evidence
that financial incentives affected physician coding decisions; increased use of cesarean delivery must
be justified by increased coded severity. This would be consistent with past evidence from the
Medicare PPS (Caner, Newbouse, and Relies, 1990). It is also consistent with the very rapid rise
in documented birth severity over the 1970s, despite no obvious deterioration in this era in the health
of pregnant women. In any case, even when we condition on individual severity in column (2), the
inducement relationship remains.
A second alternative hypothesis is that the fertility effect is operating through correlations
between birth order and cesarean delivery. A number of studies note that cesareans are more likely
for first births, as well as births which are the fifth or higher (Marieskind, 1979; Placek and Taffel,
1980; Tuning and Wojotowycz, 1992). Furthermore, as fertility declines, a larger fraction of births
will be first births,althougha smaller fraction will be of a higher order. Thus, there is a potential
for omitted variable bias from our not having birth order data.
We address this potential problem using state aggregate information on the distribution of
births across birth order. In the final column of Table 3, we include, along with the state/year
severity controls, state/year controls for the fraction of births of order 1, and the fraction of order
5ormore. Including these variables has little effect on the results. The variables themselves are
21'The effect on order 1 is much larger; summing the fraction of births that are of order 1 and
order 5ormore, there is a strong negative correlation with fertility.27
insignificant.The resultis similar if theindividuallevel severity controls are included as well.
Athirdalternativeis thatour findingsarenot theresult ala robust correlation, but rather
are driven by the experience of one or two outlying states. Alternatively, our findings may simply
reflect the experience of one outlying region where fertility was falling and taste for cesareans was
rising. In results not reported,wehave tried both excluding from our sample the five states with
the largest fertility fall and the fivestateswith the largest fertility riseover the1970-1982 period,
and allowing each of the four census regions to have its own specific time trend in fertility. In both
cases, the correlation between fertility and cesarean delivery was robust.
Finally, this finding could be a function of changing insurance coverage of mothers.
Unfortunately,wehave been unable to control for source of payment in the regressions thus far
because it is missing before 1977. As noted above, cesarean delivery is more likely for Insured
mothers, and I.eibowitz (1990) shows that births are likely to be moved forward if insurance
coveragebecomesmoregenerous. Thisevidence suggests that any bias from omitted insurance
status measures is going against our finding of a negative correlation between fertility and cesarean
delivery. Nevertheless, we can use the data on payer source for the period from 1977 onwards to
examine the effect of omitting insurance type from our regression.2'
In the first column of Table 4, we present our regression results for the 1977 to 1982 period
2'A related economic omitted variable is the labor force participation of the mothers in our
sample. Female labor force participation was also increasing dramatically during the period under
study. Increased labor force participation is likely to be correlated with reduced, or delayed, fertility
(Olsen, 1994). The correlation between labor force participation and the desire for cesarean is
unclear: on the one hand, cesarean delivery offers increased predictability in the timing of delivery;
on the other hand, the recovery tints forcesareansare generally longer than for normal childbirth.
We do not have information on labor force attachment for our sample, and there is not even data
available for the 1970s on female labor force participation rates by state/year. As a proxy, we have
tied in earlier work controlling for the state unemployment rate and state average income. This had
no effect on our relationship of interest.
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oniy. The relationship of interest is robust to this sample period restriction; the coefficient is almost
identical to that in Table 2. and is statistically significant. In the next colunm we include dummy
variables for being privately insured or being uninsured. These variables have their expected signs,
but the control for being uninsured is small and Significant. There is little effect on the coefficient
of interest, suggesting no bias from omitted insurance status variables.
The surprising finding of an equal rate for publicly insured (the excluded group) and
uninsured patients may be a function of omitted characteristics correlated with payer status. A large
literature documents the fact that the uninsured are in worse health along a number of dimensions
(it. Kasper, 1986), whith would bias them towards havingmorecesarean deliveries conditional on
financial incentives. In column (3) of Table 4, we control for individual severity using the measures
listed in Table 3. Doing so substantially reduces the coefficient on private pay and raises (in absolute
value) the coefficient on uninsured, althougJ the latter remains insignificant
The data on payer source allow a further test of our hypothesis. If physicians are inducing
cesarean delivery for financial purposes, then this response should be greatest among those with the
most generous insurance coverage, and smallest for those with the least generous. That is, for
uninsured patients who can be expected to only pay a small portion of their bill, there is little
expected reward to performing a cesarean relative to a normal childbirth. For privately insured
patients, where the fee differential is greatest, the rewards will be the greatest as well. Therefore,
if financial incentives are driving the fertility/cesarean relationship, we should see that this
relationship is strongest for those with private insurance and weakest for the uninsured.
WedemonstratethatthisisthecaseintheremainingcoluntnsotTable4. Wedosoby
augmenting our basic regression framework with interactions between payer status and the fertility
rate. As we show in column (4),theprivate payer interaction is negative, indicating that fertility29
fails h their greatest impact on this population,andthe uninsured interaction is positive, indicating
the smallest impact of fertility changes on this group. That is, for the privately insured, the net
effect of a 10% drop in fertility is *risein the cesarean rate of 1.15 percentage points; but for the
uninsured, the net effect is a rise in the cesarean raze of only 0.65 percentage points. Neither
interaction is significant,however, perhaps dueto the collinearity in the insurance measures.In the
nexttwo columns, we therefore include these interactionsseparately,and they achkve significance
ineach case.
In the final three columns,werepeatthis exerciseincluding theseveritycontrols. The story
is similar; the findingsarestronger,albeitless precisely estimated!0 In fact, in this case we
estimatethata 10% fall in fertility led to a rise in the cesarean rate for the privately insured of 1.1
percentage points, buta rise for the uninsuredof only0.27 percentagepoints.Thus, overall, the
results aresupportiveof our contention thatthe fertilitycoefficient measuresaresponseto financial
incentive incentives;fertilityfalls inducedcesarean increasesinthe verygroups where the financial
incentives were strongest.
Fart V: Is There an Asymmetric Response to Fertility Changes?
In the initial interpretation of our results, we applied the coefficient on fertility to its 1970-
1982 trend in order to assess the contribution of fertility declines to the growth of cesarean delivery.
However, sudi an interpretation is only appropriate if the use of cesarean deliveryreacts
symmetrically to increases and decreases in the fertility rate. In fact, there is reasonto suspect an
asymmetric response of cesarean delivery to inducement incentives. Evenif ob/gyns would like to
*The coefficients on the main effects (private pay and uninsured coefficients) are actually wrong
signed, in columns (4)-(9), but at the mean fertility rate the partial derivatives arecorrectly signed
when the severity controls are included.30
switcj back to normal delivery, it may be difficult to do so once cesartan delivery has become an
accepted mode of delivery for a given type of birth. The most likely explanation for such an
asymmetry would be theevolution of malpracticerules, which use local standards ofcarein deciding
whether treatment was appropriate. If cesarean delivery had evolved to be the standard of care for
that type of birth, then this built-in irreversibility of malpractice standards will make it difficult to
revert to vaginal childbirth." More generally, a model with evolving practice "norms" could also
yield a similar prediction of technological 'stickiness'.
If technological diffusion is "sticky', it has important implications for the evaluation of
economic incentives; such hysteresis suggests potential long run effects of short run economic
changes. It may also implyasymmetricresponses to declines and increases in fertility, with the
declining fertility of the early 1970s leading to differential adoption of cesarean delivery across areas,
but the subsequent increase having no effect. Indeed, the time series evidence would suggest that
this is the case, as cesarean delivery continued to grow after 1976 despite a rise in the fertility raze.
The time series evidence, however, does not prove that there is an asymmetric response, because our
analysis controls for general time effects in considering the effect of differential state fertility
changes.
Inthis section, therefore,wetest for an asymmetric response of theuseofcesareandelivery
to rising and falling fertility rates. Wedoso by creating for each state two subperiods: a "falling"
period,anda "non-falling' period. Nationaily,theseperiods would berepresentedby1970-1975,
and1975-1982 respectively; for North Carolina, 1970-1916 and 1976-1982; for Kansas, 1970-1973
and 1913-1982 (refer to Figures 2-3b). One potentially problematic issue is how to treat the "turning
'10f course, if the irreversibility was symmetric, then practice patterns would never change. But
there may be a systematic bias in evolving standards of care towards the newest standard, at the cost
of possible reversibility to the old standard..31
poinC year, in which the rapid decline ended and (for most states) a gradual rise began (Ic. 1976 lot
North Carolina). In the analysis below, we try three different approaches: including this year in the
fallingperiod, including it in the 'non-fallingperiod, and dropping it altogether.
Werunregressionsof the form:
(7) CSEC, =((a+$1X + $2PREV+$,Z+$4FALL, + $3FERT.+$6FERT,FALL,
+$.5 + $,; + Ejj)
where FALL, is a dummy which is equal to one if state jis in the failing sample in year t, and
o otherwise. In this framework. $6 measures the differential effect of fertility on cesarean delivery
in the period where fertility is falling. If there is a symmetric response to falling and rising fertility,
then $ should be equal to the previous estimates for the fertility effect, and $ shoutd be equal to
zero. There is some heterogeneity in the tinting of the turning points across stales: 21 stateshave
their turning points in 1976, 7 in 1975, 3 in 1974, 17 in 1973, and 1 in 1972.
The results of estimating this equation are presented in Table 5, for the three different
treatments of the turning point year. In no case is there evidence of an asymmetric response.The
response to fertility is equally strong in the period where fertility is risingand falling. This suggests
that, at the margin, physicians are able to both increase and decrease intensityin response to
financial incentives.
Part VI: Conclusions
Rising medical costs have been a primary impetus for health care reformin the U.S. Yet,
despite the concern of public policy-makers over this phenomenon, the causesof these cost increases
are not welt understood. Attempts to account for this increase in costs byfactor! such as the aging
of the population, increased income, and the growth in insurance coverage leavewell over half of32
the costrise unexplained (Newhouse,1992). This residualis often attributed tothe diffusion of
costlynew medical technologies (Newhouse, 1992; Weisbrod, 1991), and recent theoretical work
(Goddeeris, 1984; Baurngardner, 1991)haseven suggested that such technological advance in
incdcine may be welfare reducing. A key question for evaluating these models is whether physician
financial incentives play any role in the adoption of new medical procedures.
We have investigated the role of physician financial incentives in the substitution of cesarean
childbirth for normal delivery in the 1970-1982 period. Cesarean delivery is fairly inexpensive
relative to other'replacement'medical technologies.Yet, itsveryrapid adoption despitea lack of
convincing evidence that it leads to improvements in birth outcomes raises the possibilitythatthis
was not simply the case of a higher quality technique replacing an inferior one. Our results suggest
that, in fact, physician financial incentives did play a significant role in the substitution towards
cesarean childbirth. However, this role was a small one relative to other factors explaining the rapid
growth in cesarean utilization.
This work can be usefully extended in at least three directions. First, similar tests could be
carried out for the adoption of other medical technologies in different time periods. This would be
particularly useful for cases of very expensive replacement technologies with little convincing
evidence of improved outcomes. Second, our paper leaves largely unanswered the question of why
cesarean delivery, which could be done fairly successfully from the start of the 20th century onwards
(Marieskind, 1979), spread so rapidly after 1970. Finally, there is a general sense in the medical
literature that the level of cesarean delivery is 'too high1 (NIH, 1981). Such a conclusion can only
be drawn after weighing more carefully the costs and benefits of this procedure. While there is
considerable evidence on the physiological and financial costs of cesarean delivery, there is little
convincing evidence on its benefits. Assessing these benefits should be a high priority for futureresearch.
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Table 1: Means oftheDaMseL
All Births No C-Section C-Section
Ceure.nDeliveey 0.119 0 I
Age C20 0.171 0.183 0.134
Age 20-25 0.341 0.346 0.308
Age 25-30 0.296 0.293 0.321
Age 30-35 0.132 0.128 0.165
Age 35-40 0.041 0.039 0.055
Age 40-45 0.010 0.009 0.014
Age 45 + 0.002 0.002 0.003
Manied 0.793 0.792 0.798
White 0.693 0.692 0.698
Black 0.163 0.163 0.161
Number of Beds 360.5 356.8 388.2
[301.2] (302.5] [389.4]
For-Profit 0.035 0.035 0.041
Government 0.261 0.264 0.237
Previous Ceasrean 0.035 0.001 0.286
Breech Pnsentasion 0.028 0.011 0.107
Fetal Distress 0.045 0.015 0.272
Mstcrnai Distress 0.022 0.014 0083
OUtr CompIlations 0.329 0.305 0.509
Ob/Gyns per 100 births 0.621 0.614 0.67!
[0.24.8) [0.246] (0.2611
Ob/Gyn per 100 population 0.954 0.946 1.020
(10') (0.304J (0.301] (0.319]
Birthspa100population 1.59 1.60 1.57
[0.23] [0.241 [0.23]
Numberof Obeervations 255593 225202 30391
•': Data Irons NHDS dataset sad other sources described in tnt.39
- Table 2: Bask Regression Results
Depa3dalt Variable isa Dummy for Ceurean Delivery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Ob/Gyn per 100 births 0.578
(0.126)
Log Fertility -0.888 -0.923
(Biztbs per 100 population) (0.202) (0.201)
Log OJ,/Qyn per 0.342 0.410
100 population (0.174) (0.174)
Ag. 20-25 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Age 25-30 0.081 0.081 0.082 0.082
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Age 30-35 0.153 0.153 0.153 0,154
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age 35-40 0.419 0.418 0.418 0.419
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Age 40-45 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.615
(0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
Age 45+ 0.341 0.341 0.342 0,342
(0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143)
Married 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.018
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
WhiLe 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.024
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
BLACk -0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Previous Cesarean 5.760 5.761 5.761 5.760
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Number ci Beds 0.263 0.264 0.263 0.264
(/10,) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
For-Profit 0.091 0.092 0.094 0.093
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Government -0.197 -0.198 -0.198 -0.197
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
j: Siandard errors in parentheses. Regressions .rc run as logits.All regressionsinclude full set of state and
yeas dummies. N 255,593.40
-Table3: Spccificañoc Uiccb -BirthSeventy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dq,eodcat Var. Cesarean Cesaresn Fe4al Matinal Cesarean
Log FinAlity -0S34 -1.015 -0A95 -0.951 -0.883
(0.205) (0.230) (0.274) (0.347) (0.211)
Neonatal -0.018 0.015 -0.031 0.0fl -0.019
Mortality (0.012) (0.015) (0016) (0.023) (0.014)
Low Rurthweigbi 14.12 7.152 7.634 13.50 15.52
(C2500grams) (4,671) (5.713) (6.213) (8.388) (4.706)
HighBirthweight 12.10 18.65 0.674 -3.131 12.32
(>4200 grams) (7.481) (9.173) (9.691) (13.48) (7.505)
Previous 5.761 7.421 -0.483 -0.476 5.761













jg: Standard won in parentheses. All regressions include set orregressosepresented in Table 2. along with

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Trnhwlo(Twtng (1) (2) (3)
PointYen Include in Fill Include in Rise Drop
Iag Fatility -0.929 -0.874 -0.881
(0.202) (0.207) (0.212)
Falling? 0.234 -0.029 -0.005
(0.580) (0.634) (0.650)
FtilityFmlling 0.055 0.002 0.003
(0.137) (0.150) (0.153)
Number of Cbs 255,593 255,593 236,950
NS:Standsxdenomin paraitheses. MI regrissions include set of regressors presented in Table 2, along with
full set of state and year dummies. All regressions nui u logits. Dependent variable is cesarean section dummy.


































I I I I I
972 1974 1976 1978 1980
year











1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
year
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"S: Standarderrors in parentheses. All regressions include set ofregressorspresented in Table 2,alongwith
lull setofstate and year dummies. All regressions nan as logits.Dependentvariableiscesarean section dummy.
N= 255,593.